All Policy Analysis by Michael Singh

Watch as an expert panel assesses the full sweep of U.S. policy toward Iran in the twenty-first century across the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations.

Leaders in the Middle East feel more threatened by the competition between China and the United States than by the individual powers themselves, so Washington needs to adapt accordingly.

The regime's latest step on uranium enrichment should compel the United States and its partners to snap back sanctions, bolster military deterrence, and plan for potential crisis scenarios.

As with Russia, Persian Gulf states may be reluctant to cross Beijing if conflict erupts in Asia, but Washington should remind them that even narrow financial action can help counter any Chinese moves on Taiwan.

No deal is possible between a Ukraine that is making steady battlefield progress and a Russia in denial of this reality, but they might get there if Kyiv keeps winning.

Because many states are eschewing both alignment with a single great power and nonalignment, the best U.S. response to this “omni-alignment” is creating more tailored opportunities for high-value cooperation with Washington.

Although Ankara will likely approve the Nordic expansion down the road, hurdles remain for Sweden, and Russia may play the spoiler’s role unless Washington facilitates the process.

Recent Chinese and Russian actions have shaken the national security establishment out of its complacency, underscoring how American cooperation with Europe, the Middle East, and other actors will not be so straightforward in this new era of great-power competition.

The accords may point to a future in which the United States can do less in the region—but to get there, Washington must first do more.

Tehran has seemingly concluded that sanctions relief is no longer worth compromising for, so Washington needs to change that calculus by credibly sharpening the consequences.

Although Tehran’s specific JCPOA demand may not be feasible, it opens the door to negotiating a new nuclear deal.

Washington's current regional posture of heavy presence but strategic diffidence offers China the best of both worlds—a continued American security umbrella over countries increasingly interested in diversifying their great power relationships.

China’s "wolf warrior" diplomacy has discovered the Middle East, catching Washington unprepared.

It is unclear whether those who seek to carry on his foreign policy legacy will embrace wan realism, amoral nationalism, or a more successful conservative internationalism, but either way a clear-eyed evaluation of U.S. challenges and options is crucial.

Tehran’s nuclear and regional activities are part of a single strategy that aims to paralyze stronger foes, so Washington’s policies for responding to each challenge should likewise overlap considerably.

There is greater American bipartisan consensus on national security strategy than Washington’s fractious politics would indicate, creating ample room for transatlantic cooperation on that front.

Turkey’s leader has caused many headaches in Washington in recent years, but letting ties deteriorate further would be disastrous.

Jakarta’s domestic politics make normalization unlikely despite years of positive signals, but the United States should nevertheless urge it to consider incremental, mutually beneficial steps toward rapprochement with Jerusalem.

The growing Arab-Israeli rapprochement may be good for the Middle East, but it poses problems for Beijing’s strategy in the region.

Continuing the status quo—a large American presence, but uncertain American commitment—would be a high-cost, high-risk, low-reward approach.