Policy Analysis

The growing linkage between Soviet domestic and foreign policy is producing dramatic changes in its Middle East positions. The Soviet regime is playing a key role on some aspects of the Gulf crisis, but its freedom of action is quite constrained in others because of the internal struggle for power

The recent violence in Jerusalem has again raised fears that Iraq can utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to break the coalition opposed to its aggression. An accurate assessment of Saddam Hussein's support among non-Iraqi Arabs is critical to understanding this question, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on

Last week's decision by the Soviet Union to establish consular relations with Israel is just one element of a far-reaching evolution in Moscow's Mideast policy. Accelerated by the shock of the Persian Gulf crisis, this process is drawing Soviet views on the Arab-Israeli conflict closer to those of the United

As the United States enters the third month of its deployment in the Persian Gulf, there is increasing concern about what Saddam Hussein could do to undermine American will or reverse Iraqi diplomatic isolation. Given the array of forces against it and faith in an ability to outlast the world

The visit of Soviet special envoy Yevgeny Primakov to Baghdad today in search of a diplomatic resolution of the Gulf crisis is another sign of Moscow's growing interest in the crisis as a catalyst for a new Soviet role in the Middle East. Last Sunday's decision to establish diplomatic relations

Of all the states in the Middle East, Iran's policy has been the most confusing and mysterious. Yet a close examination shows that Tehran has followed a consistent, predictable, attitude toward the Gulf crisis. From Tehran's standpoint, the current situation is the obverse of that prevailing during the eight-year Iran-Iraq

"Will sanctions against Iraq work?" is a question too ambiguous to be useful. It leaves unspecified such key issues as what we want sanctions to accomplish and how Iraq would react if sanctions started to pinch. And, then, how much does Saddam Hussein care about what happens to Iraq's economy

One of the most controversial statements during this crisis was Secretary of State James Baker's call for a new Persian Gulf security framework. If Saddam Hussein and/or Iraq's military might survive this confrontation, local states will face continued threats. For them to cooperate with the United States now they must

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is using the Gulf crisis as a catalyst for farreaching changes in Moscow's Middle East policy. Moscow is putting the emphasis on improving relations with the West and with the wealthy Persian Gulf states at the expense of Arab radicals. Shevardnadze's UN speech was remarkable

Impatience and doubts about the slow-working process of diplomacy and economic sanctions has led many to call for quick military action against Iraq. While the United States could eventually prevail in such a conflict, the anticipated high cost in American casualties will make President Bush less eager to pursue a

By the time Washington finishes arguing about who lost Kuwait, a new debate may have to be joined about the failure of U.S. policy toward Jordan. The Kuwait crisis is drawing King Hussein into Saddam Hussein's orbit with profound consequences for the stability of the Middle East heartland and the

Saddam Hussein's threats to attack Israel or Saudi oil fields if sanctions begin to strangle him must be taken seriously by defenders of those purported targets but are most likely bluffs to forestall the mounting pressure on Iraq and raise his subjects' morale. It is not clear that Iraq has

The Fifth Annual Policy Conference of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, held September 14-16, brought out a number of new ideas and perspectives on the Persian Gulf crisis. These included important points about administration strategy, the attitudes of Arab states and Israel, the time frame for various tactics

Keynote addresses by Moshe Arens, Richard Haass, Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, and Paul Wolfowitz.

On September 14-16, 1990, The Washington Institute held its fifth annual Policy Conference at the Wye Plantation. The following is an edited transcript of one speaker's remarks. Read a summary of the full conference. We are now seeing not just the outlines of a post-war security order, but the outlines

On September 14-16, 1990, The Washington Institute held its fifth annual Policy Conference at the Wye Plantation. The following is an edited transcript of one speaker's remarks. Read a summary of the full conference. The situation inside Kuwait is indescribable. Iraq has isolated Kuwait from the civilized world; the 1.5

Secretary of State Baker's idea of developing "a new security structure" for the Middle East has been the subject of much attention. What specifically does the U.S. have in mind? The most honest answer is not much. It appears that, in raising the idea, Secretary Baker was for the most

Did President Bush reverse long-standing policy by inviting the USSR to play a role in Middle East peacemaking? No. In fact, the summit outcome points to two other conclusions. First, the Bush administration has been willing from the outset to give the Soviet Union a role in Middle East peacemaking

It is surprising how few Arabs and Arab states are supporting Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. As Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Damascus on Thursday shows, the anti-Iraq coalition includes the Arab world's three other most important powers: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. This triumverate marks the Arab world's

Iraq's chemical weapons pose two major questions for U.S. policy today: • How threatening are these arms to U.S. forces? • What should the United States and its allies do to neutralize these weapons if Iraq's current capacities survive the crisis? Iraq is now the world's largest producer of chemical